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During the time of the civil war, the ESAF consisted of the regular army with the National Guard acting in rural internal security functions. After being defeated conventionally in 1981, the FMLN resorted to an insurgency. Clifford Krauss suggests that the defeat lead to 12 long years of a dirty insurgency, which killed 75,000 and left 8,000 missing, which both sides being guilty of human rights atrocities. Therefore, these conditions are dependant variables that need to be developed in conjunction to successfully stop the civil war. The distinct qualities of El Salvador make it a model case in application to other countries that suffer from the same conditions. These conditions being: an oligarchy, which controlled the political, and economic landscape; brutal military repression of the population; a monocrop economy with a inextricable link to the global economy; and a disaffected well educated middle class. El
Salvador serves as a model in the identification and understanding of conditions that will enable states in peril of or the midst of civil war to reconcile the warring factions and bring them back together into a durable and enduring peace. 5 In 1993, Thomas 5 The definition of "durable peace" references Michael Lund's Curve of Conflict from Michael S. Lund. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventative Diplomacy (Washington, DC:USIP Press Books, 1996) Lund defines durable peace as "Durable (or Warm) Peace involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defense measures among parties, although it may include their military alliance against a common threat. A 'positive peace' prevails based on shared values, goals, and institutions (e.g. democratic
Wickham-Crowley wrote a study on the conditions for social revolution in Latin America during the periods of 1956 -1990. 6 In this study, he cites five conditions that create a • What were the causes for revolution?
• What caused the formation of the FMLN?
• • What was US foreign policy in El Salvador during the conflict?
• What were the true sources of FMLN support during the Civil War?
• What were the motivations of the FMLN, the GoES, and the civilian population?
• What were the provisions of the peace accord?
This monograph is divided into five separate yet linked sections. The first section discusses the root of the civil war and the rise of the FMLN as the opposition to the ruling party. It is important to discuss this in the context of El Salvador because the grievances of the Salvadoran people are at the heart of the problem in the conflict.
Without a good understanding of the main issues of the conflict, one cannot effectively analyze the motivations of the actors involved. The second section discusses the conflict itself and describes how each side fought the war with the resources they had and evolved with the external assistance of each side's sponsor. Looking the actual conflict itself serves to help the reader better understand each side's goals and strategies and the goals of their external sponsors. The third section discusses the external conditions that support the move towards peace in El Salvador. This section of the monograph analyzes the involvement of the United States and the Soviet-bloc countries that had a key role in supporting the warring factions of Salvadoran society. In the fourth section, this monograph analyzes the internal conditions that were key in promoting the peace process. It looks at goals that the Government of El Salvador strived to achieve, the shortfalls of the FMLN's goals, and the absolute exhaustion of Salvadoran society during the civil war. The fifth section of this monograph discusses the outcome of the peace process and its lingering effects on Salvadoran society today.
This monograph is limited in scope to identifying the significant conditions that contributed to the end of the civil war. It uses various primary and secondary sources to set the stage for the discussion of the significant conditions. It also investigates the current conditions of El Salvador and the true state of its stable peace.
There have been numerous writings on the subject of the Salvadoran civil war and the transition to a negotiated peace. Many of these works focus on the history of El Salvador and the roots of the conflict, the evolution of the actors during the conflict and finally the conditions that brought both parties to the negotiating table to develop a stable peace and a form of working democracy. Most of the writings about this period in El Salvador's history agree that the civil war was an inevitable outcome of the systemic social and economic problems that had plagued that country since the 1930s. Where they are divergent is what brought about the conditions for both warring factions to put aside their differences. Mario Lungo Uclés discusses that the FMLN used the military options as purely a means to get the Government of El Salvador (GoES) to negotiate for peace.
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Joaquin Villalobos, a former FMLN commander, refutes the fact that the FMLN suffered from a lack of support from the civilian population of El Salvador and from their communist supporters after the end of the cold war.
8 Elisabeth Jean Wood shows how the sustained insurgency by the FMLN was able to force reform in the GoES that allowed the negotiations with the FMLN take place. 9 There is also the common popular theory that the policies of the Reagan administration and the US supported counterinsurgency eventually contributed to the weakness of the FMLN's resolve and their unsuccessful "final" offensives in 1981 and 1989. 7 Mario Lungo Ucles, El Salvador in the Eighties (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press: 1996) This monograph analyzes the period of the civil war in El Salvador (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) .
This period lays the foundation and delineates the conditions for the beginnings of an amnesty, reintegration and reconciliation (AR2) process. While AR2 is not directly referenced, there is a thread that runs through this period that links to the future process of reconciliation between the GoES and the FMLN. Studies, 1996 Studies, ), 10 (1979 Studies, -1984 , and 4) the military under democratic rule (1984-present) . 16 The economic oligarchy made up of the wealthy landowners, also known as the "fourteen families".
Roots of the Civil War in El Salvador
These "fourteen families" were supported by the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF), which left the oligarchy free to rule the country with their own best interests in mind. Castro told the Salvadorans that if they unified, Cuba was prepared to extend the weapons pipeline they had developed to El Salvador. If unification was not possible, Cuba would cut the Salvadorans off and offer the aid to the Guatemalans.
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The FMLN demonstrates its roots in that it was named after the legendary rebel Tommie Sue Montgomery remarks that the FMLN was dedicated to the armed revolutionary struggle against the GoES to install a democratic revolutionary government based on the Leninist ideal of democratic centralism. 24 The FMLN advocated a Marxist political approach in part because that ideology claimed to remedy perceived and actual socio-economic inequalities amongst the population. Even with the unification of the five parties, discord remained between them.
The basis for the Salvadoran civil war was the disparity between the haves and have-nots and enforced by an exclusive political system. All this in conjunction with the extreme repression by the ESAF of the population, are the true ingredients of a revolution. As this monograph shows, answering the root problems of the Salvadoran system can be a catalyst for eliminating civil war, as we shall see in the reform policies of the GoES in later sections. Even with the promise of sweeping reforms the junta had a hard road to travel to reach their goals. The right and left wings viewed the junta as a threat to their perceived goals and they would thwart the junta by any means necessary. In as much, the left wing guerillas of the ERP took control of a San Salvador slum neighborhood two days after the successful coup. The newly installed junta government responded to demonstrators, labor strikers and campesinos in force and killed 24 people. 27 The reform intentioned junta lost control of the army to far-right wing officers that intended to subvert the junta.
The Conflict (1980-1992)
This did not prove to be the reforms that the country was looking for. "the application of regular tactics , where massing of force was the determining condition …we need to move to combine with certainty, regular and irregular tactics, conventional war and guerilla war…we must move to form guerilla units…to strike the enemy -in defense when he makes incursions in the zones of control, as well as in the offense in his vital areas and his strategic rear." infrastructure. The offensive lasted a total of six days, three days longer than the FMLN expected to be fighting and not with the expected outcome. The ESAF had successfully routed the FMLN offensive, regained control of any parts of the country that was in FMLN hands, and reconsolidated their positions in preparation for any counterattacks.
In the end, the FMLN were not able to achieve their key objectives during the offensive. They were unable to assassinate any of GoES key leadership, and there was no uprising of the people of El Salvador against the regime and join in the fighting against the ESAF. To the contrary, the Singlaub report states that the FMLN only succeeded in getting the local populace to turn against them due to their tactics endangering civilians, as was seen in the tactic of using civilians as human shields and commandeering civilian homes. In some cases, the civilian populace became informants for the ESAF and successfully collected intelligence about FMLN. "Most of the people…refused to help the FMLN in any way, including digging trenches, building barricades and so forth." 
External Conditions that Contributed to the Peace Process
This section describes and analyzes the external conditions that contributed to bringing the peace process to fruition in El Salvador. The two main conditions that this section discusses are the United States foreign policy during the eighties and the counter policy of the external aid from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to the FMLN 35 Ibid., 10 rebels. These were by far the most influential conditions that sustained the warring for much of the conflict. Without the external aid from either one of the sides, a more decisive victory may have resulted in favor of one of the sides.
US Foreign Policy (1979-1990)
We Woerner's report he outlined the specific conditions that needed to be addressed to transitions the EASF. These were 1) subordination of the officer corps to civilian authority; 2) the respect for human rights by the armed forces; and 3) the institutionalization of officer and non-commissioned officer professional development and become operationally effective. 44 The Woerner report was the beginnings of developing a national military strategy for the GoES.
With the change in FMLN tactics to more irregular warfare, the EASF was required to transform into a fighting force capable of responding to the emerging threats.
The United States advisors felt that a more mobile and agile force with the ability to take to fight to the FMLN was necessary to improve the ESAF.
In addition to the military strategy, the United States attempted to persuade the GoES and ESAF that there was a need for economic and social reform. Ambassador
Passage remarks that the US government had very clear ideas for El Salvador in the ways they could implement economic reform :
"We forced the GOES to enact reforms, including land, education, health services, dig wells, build roads and clinics, create jobs, bust apart the oligarchy's stranglehold over coffee and rice and sugar production, shrimp cultivation, and other key elements of the economy, tackle corruption. Of course this was going to be disruptive to the economy and society." Salvador, 1982 23 February 1987 The insurgents in El Salvador were heavily dependent on external aid to finance, 
Foreign Aid to the Insurgency in El Salvador (1980 -1989)

Internal Conditions that Contributed to the Peace Process
This section describes and analyzes the internal conditions that lead to a negotiated peace in El Salvador. These conditions include the real attempts at 50 Gantiva and Palacios, 133 reformation that the Duarte government in El Salvador, with the prodding of the United
States, began to implement. Another significant condition that this monograph discusses is the lack of FMLN unification. In addition, the war weariness and lack of mass mobilization and support to the FMLN had significant effects on the continuation of the war and the move toward peace.
The Reformation
I have had to sacrifice some values of ideological thinking in order to provide the country and escape -a hope towards a better future. I am paying the political price today for the benefit of tomorrow.
José Napoleón Duarte President, Republic of El Salvador, 1984 -1989 20 November 1987 As far as reforms of the GoES go, the most successful was in the changes in the Salvador's economy, was that they had to change themselves so that the typical campesino and his family would begin to actively support the Government side rather than the guerrillas. In the end, they did: the FMLN never had the support of more than 15-20% of the population and even that began dropping once the military got out of politics, the 1982 constitution was enacted, Duarte was elected, and the reforms began."
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The more El Salvador became democratic the more the people were demobilized from the FMLN further eroding the FMLN support base.
The statements of a former FMLN commander even further evidence this.
Joaquin Villalobos states that " The democratic changes that took place before the Peace Agreement were partial and imperfect but felt tangibly by the insurgency. This gave credibility to the idea that working politically in a context of peace was more beneficial than continuing war." 55 The FMLN willingness to accept that the GoES was genuinely implementing reforms to install a true democratic society in El Salvador was a great step towards achieving peace between the warring parties.
In The key provisions of the Peace Accords were a compromise between the two warring parties. The GoES had to fulfill the following provisions:
• Reform the military
• Establish a new national civilian police force
• Enact human rights reforms
• Enact political, economic and social reforms that included electoral, judicial and land reallocations
• The FMLN had to ensure that they demobilized, disarmed, and joined the political process as a legal political party.
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Given El Salvador's history, it is not surprising that the civil war resolution brought mixed results, despite the oversight role of the UN. In the realm of military reforms dictated by the accords, all issues were resolved with relative success. Political reforms succeeded in creating the institutions necessary to enable democracy, but the participants exploited them to their own advantage, rather than that of the state. In large measure, economic reforms substantively changed Salvadoran domestic systems for the good, but the Salvadoran economic picture still has several obstacles to overcome.
Among the prerequisites for a transition to a peaceful society, the disarmament and demobilization of the FMLN took center stage. The United Nations declared this process completed by 1993 without lasting violations by either side. 67 The demilitarization of the FMLN was a convenient way to end the military standoff and ensure that the civil war did not resume. It laid the foundations for the transition of guerilla forces into society. In exchange, the government forces were directed to assume a defensive stance against external threats and relinquish their role as a domestic law enforcer. 68 The accord also laid out how the ESAF would reform its officer corps and force structure.
The accords called for the ESAF to establish an ad hoc commission in which the ESAF would "self-purge" the officer corps of members involved with extra-legal killings during the civil war. 69 Furthermore, the accords directed ESAF to dismantle its covert intelligence service, National Guard, and Treasury Police while also reducing the size of the Army by 50%. In addition, the military had to fall under the control of civilian leadership. These measures met with various degrees of success. The ESAF never dismantled the National Guard and Treasury Police; the ESAF merely renamed them and transferred their entire structures into the regular army. 70 The army was reduced, however, and the ad-hoc commission removed complicit officers from the command structure. It took several years for the military to complete the transition of key governmental institutions to civilian authorities.
The accords also called for the reformation of the Policía Nacional (PN). It included the dissolution of the PN and the establishment of a new Policía Nacional Civilista (PNC). The PNC was to be the "first time that internal security was separated from the military". 71 The makeup of the new PNC consisted of 60% of civilians who were not associated with the conflict, 20% from the old PN and 20% from the FMLN.
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This was a remarkable attempt at reintegration of the FMLN into the mainstream government.
The accords also focus discussion on the transition of the FMLN from an outlawed entity to a legal political party. In the demobilization and disarmament of the He appeared somewhat startled, as though he hadn't given it much thought beyond that they would relinquish their weapons and come down out of the mountains to rejoin civil society. No, I said, you have a force of approximately 30,000 men whose only known skill is fighting. What do you think they will do, what sort of work would they be likely to get in a society that already has between a 15-25% unemployment rate?
Thus was born the origins of his subsequent plan to incorporate them into the Army and Police (despite the strong reservations of army and police commanders) and creation of the Policía Nacional Civilista (PNC). Expecting them to come down out of the mountains and 'find work' is nonsense; there has to be some planning for job creation, either in the security forces or elsewhere." The findings demonstrate how not one condition was the tipping point or the sole key to ending the war in El Salvador, but that they all play key roles to resolve the conflict. If one condition emerged as prevalent, it is the answering the root causes of the conflict. By treating the illness of the system and it systemic problems and treating those problems, an actor can actually bring the conflict to a close stave off the conflict.
In context of El Salvador's civil war, this monograph identifies some general principles that one can apply to future case studies. The first principle is that the government in peril must be willing to change and address the ills of their society that causes the civil war. The second principle identified is external support for the government / denial of support for the insurgency is key in allowing the first principle to take effect. A third condition that one should develop is a national counterinsurgency strategy that comprehensively looks at the political, military and economic aspects of the nation at risk.
El Salvador demonstrates that it is extremely important for the afflicted government to address the issues and grievances of the disaffected constituency. In El Salvador, the GoES, even after the coup of the civil-military junta made an effort to begin the reform process. As demonstrated earlier, actors that did not advocate change in the government frustrated those attempts. The US Army's Counterinsurgency Manual, FM 3-24, states that a successful counterinsurgency divorces the insurgents from their support base. The GoES's willingness to reform lent it more legitimacy with the populace thereby divorcing the FMLN from them. To further support this claim, A.J. Bacevich, states that "victory required first redressing the grievances of the Salvadoran people." 75 As stated earlier, the FMLN was striving for a mass mobilization and uprising of the people of El Salvador, the GoES's reform initiatives began to erode the FMLN's support base. If the GoES could send the message to the population that life would be better with the government than with the revolutionaries it should follow that the population would side with the government.
The case of El Salvador further demonstrates that external support for the government in crisis is crucial to ending the insurgency's capability to wage the civil war.
On the other side, the insurgency must be denied external support. One of WickhamCrowley's key conditions for why revolution would not be successful is loss of support from the United States. This is also one of the key conditions in this model, continued support to the government in peril. The case of El Salvador showed how US involvement and support, both economic and military was key to aiding the GoES during the civil war.
As stated earlier, the United States funneled over US$6 billion into the economy and military of the GoES over the course of the conflict. Without this influx of aid to the government, the civil war in El Salvador could have ended up with a very different outcome.
The analysis of this case study shows that the development of an integrated approach to how countries care for their people. As with the case of El Salvador, we can see that a military option was not the factor that ended the war. It was more the factor of changing the government and Salvadoran society as a whole in favor of a direction that would benefit all parties that ended the war. Political, economic, military and social issues should be addressed as a whole to include the understanding of how they correlate to each other to achieve an effective solution to the country in peril.
El Salvador had a great deal of assistance from the international community in how it waged its civil war and how it ended its civil war. Actors within El Salvador had to make concerted efforts to end the war. On the GoES side they had to make the much needed reforms within the society that would address the grievances of the majority. The FMLN and its five disparate guerilla groups had to come to the realization that armed struggle was not the way that they could achieve a voice within the nation and pursued a different course. Ultimately, the warring parties found something they could agree upon and that was that the war had to end. Nevertheless, El Salvador as a whole had become the key actor in developing a cure to its ills.
